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A large, refractory nosocomial outbreak of Klebsiella pneumoniae carbapenemase 1 
(KPC)-producing Escherichia coli demonstrates carbapenemase gene outbreaks 2 
involving sink sites require novel approaches to infection control  3 
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ABSTRACT 48 
Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE) are a health threat, but effective control 49 
interventions remain unclear. Hospital wastewater sites are increasingly highlighted as 50 
important potential reservoirs. We investigated a large Klebsiella pneumoniae carbapenemase 51 
(KPC)-producing E. coli (KPC-EC) outbreak and wider CRE incidence trends over eight 52 
years in the Central Manchester Foundation NHS Trust (CMFT), UK, to determine the 53 
impact of Infection Prevention and Control measures.  54 
 55 
Bacteriology and patient administration data (2009-2017) were linked; a subset of 56 
CMFT/regional KPC-EC isolates (n=268) was sequenced. Control interventions followed 57 
international guidelines and included cohorting, rectal screening (n=184,539 screens), 58 
environmental sampling, enhanced cleaning, and ward closure/plumbing replacement. 59 
Segmented regression of time trends of CRE detections was used to evaluate the impact of 60 
interventions on CRE incidence. 61 
 62 
Genomic analysis (n=268 isolates) identified spread of a KPC-EC outbreak clone (ST216, 63 
strain-A; n=125) amongst patients and the environment, particularly on two cardiac wards 64 
(W3/W4), despite control measures. ST216 strain-A had caused an antecedent outbreak, and 65 
shared its KPC plasmids with other E. coli lineages and Enterobacteriaceae. CRE acquisition 66 
incidence declined after W3/W4 closure and plumbing replacement, suggesting an 67 
environmental contribution. However, W3/W4 wastewater sites were rapidly re-colonised 68 
with CRE and patient CRE acquisitions recurred, albeit at lower rates. 69 
 70 
Patient relocation and plumbing replacement were associated with control of a clonal KPC-71 
EC outbreak; however, environmental contamination with CRE and patient CRE acquisitions 72 
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recurred rapidly following this intervention. The large numbers of cases and persistence of 73 
blaKPC in E. coli, including pathogenic lineages, is a concern.  74 
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INTRODUCTION 75 
Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE) are a global public health threat(1). Major 76 
carbapenemases include the metallo-beta-lactamases, some oxacillinases and the Klebsiella 77 
pneumoniae carbapenemase (KPC, encoded by blaKPC), one of the commonest 78 
carbapenemases globally(2). Transfer of carbapenemase genes on mobile genetic elements 79 
has resulted in the rapid, inter-species dissemination of carbapenem resistance(3, 4). Since 80 
few therapeutic options remain for CRE infections(5, 6), effective control is critical. 81 
 82 
Escherichia coli is a major human pathogen, but also a gastrointestinal commensal, and can 83 
be transmitted between humans and the environment. Carbapenem resistance in E. coli, 84 
including that encoded by blaKPC, is increasing(7, 8), but is uncommon, and KPC-E. coli 85 
outbreaks have not been observed to date. The emergence and persistence of carbapenem 86 
resistance in E. coli in human and/or environmental reservoirs is of concern. 87 
 88 
CRE detections in England have increased since 2008(9), and are approximately ten times the 89 
national average in Greater Manchester(10). Central Manchester University Hospitals NHS 90 
Foundation Trust (CMFT) has experienced an on-going multi-species blaKPC-associated CRE 91 
outbreak since 2009. Intensive Infection Prevention and Control (IPC) measures, in line with 92 
national and international recommendations(11-13), have been implemented in response. 93 
 94 
In 2015, a sudden increase in cases of faecal colonisation with KPC-producing E. coli (KPC-95 
EC) was detected in the Manchester Heart Centre (MHC) at the Manchester Royal Infirmary 96 
(MRI; part of CMFT). We retrospectively investigated the genomic epidemiology and 97 
evidence for nosocomial transmission of KPC-EC and KPC plasmids isolated from patients 98 
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and the environment in this context, and assessed the impact of guideline-compliant IPC 99 
bundles on CRE and KPC-EC incidence.  100 
 101 
RESULTS 102 
High prevalence of CRE colonisation in the MHC 103 
Between 01/Apr-30/Dec/2014, 23 new CRE-colonised individuals were detected on the 104 
MHC, including two with E. coli (Fig.1A). A CRE outbreak was declared on 02/Jan/2015 105 
when six new CRE-colonised individuals were identified (four with blaKPC, two with blaNDM; 106 
no E. coli). Consequently, intensified IPC measures were implemented (Table S1; Fig.1B), 107 
and W3/W4 were closed (06/Jan/2015), terminally cleaned (hypochlorite), and 108 
decontaminated (hydrogen peroxide vapour). W3 was re-opened on 11/Jan/2015 and W4 on 109 
23/Jan/2015; high-risk patients (CRE previously detected/history of hospitalisation abroad or 110 
in UK hospital with known CRE transmission in past 12 months) were screened; CRE-111 
positive patients were transferred to a cohort ward or, if they required cardiac monitoring, to 112 
side-rooms.  113 
 114 
By January 2015, CMFT was operating a Trust-wide CRE screening program (>110 115 
screens/day; Table S2). Between 01/Sep/2014-30/Dec/2014, screening transitioned from 116 
culture- to PCR-based methods: during this period 16,612 samples from 7,239 inpatients 117 
were screened using either culture (n=9,808), or PCR+culture (n=6,804), with an overall 118 
CRE prevalence of 3.8% (438 positive samples, 272 patients). Molecular mechanism data for 119 
135/163 (83%) PCR-positives indicated blaKPC accounted for most carbapenem resistance 120 
(97%).  121 
 122 
KPC-E. coli outbreak despite IPC interventions 123 
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Following the implementation of enhanced IPC activity, there was a further sharp increase in 124 
the number of CRE-colonised patients detected from 09/Mar/2015 (Fig.1A; CR-E. coli and 125 
other species, mostly blaKPC, a few blaNDM). W3 was again closed to admissions 126 
(11/Mar/2015-28/Mar/2015) and environmental decontamination repeated; the following 127 
week W4 was closed after detection of additional CRE-colonised patients (Figs.1A, 1B). 128 
From 01/April/2015 KPC-EC predominated in the outbreak (Fig. 1A). 129 
 130 
From April-September 2015, W3/W4 were closed repeatedly, with two peaks in KPC-EC 131 
patient colonisation (April-May and August; Fig.1B). W3 capacity was reduced to 10 day-132 
case beds (12/Aug/2015; day-case patients not screened for CRE) and W4 to 12 in-patient 133 
beds. Between 10/Aug/2015-28/Sep/2015, there were 27 new KPC-EC colonisations detected 134 
on the MHC (Fig.1A), and two cases with other KPC-Enterobacteriaceae. Of 88 KPC-EC 135 
cases between 24/Feb/2015-28/Sep 2015, 86 (98%) represented colonisations only; one 136 
individual additionally had a UTI and one a sternal wound infection (treated with gentamicin 137 
and ciprofloxacin respectively, to which the isolates were susceptible). 138 
 139 
Carbapenem-resistant E. coli cases in CMFT 140 
CR-E. coli had been isolated in CMFT prior to the 2015 MHC outbreak, with 514 CR-E. coli 141 
cases (considering first positives by patient from clinical/screening isolates, 2010-2016 142 
inclusive), and including a separate outbreak on the geratology wards (W45/46) in late 2012 143 
(Figs.2A,2B). Of these, 434 cases were detected on ≥day 2 of admission, and a further 80 on 144 
day 0-1 of admission. Case peaks were not related to screening policy changes/rates (Fig.S6). 145 
CR-E. coli were almost invariably detected from rectal screening (420/434 cases, 97%). 146 
 147 
Environmental sampling yielded CRE from sinks/drains 148 
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Intermittent environmental sampling was undertaken to identify potential reservoirs. Overall, 149 
927 samples from 833 sites were taken 09/Apr-17/Nov/2015; 355 (38%) samples from 333 150 
(40%) sites were from W3/W4, and the remainder from eleven other wards. 850 samples 151 
were from sink/drain/shower/bath sites, 18 from toilets/hoppers/sluices, and 33 from high-152 
touch sites (including keyboards, door handles, sponges etc.; labelling unclear for 26 153 
samples). Eighty-five samples (9%) and 72 sites (9%) were CRE-positive (26/355 samples 154 
[7%], 21/333 sites [6%] on W3/4). CRE-positive sites included: shower drains (n=19), sink 155 
taps (n=7); sink drain tailpieces (n=10); sink drain strainers (n=8); sink trap water (n=1); 156 
toilet bowls (n=1); other (n=26). Common isolates cultured included: Klebsiella spp. (n=34), 157 
Enterobacter spp. (n=25), and E. coli (n=11) (Fig.1A). All CRE-positive cultures were from 158 
wastewater/plumbing-associated sites; no other sites tested were CRE-positive. 159 
 160 
Of ten sites yielding 11 KPC-EC isolates, five were in the W3/W4 kitchen (14-18/May/2015 161 
[n=4], 10/Sep/2015 [n=1]), one a W4 staff sink (14/May/2015), and four from kitchen 162 
sinks/drains on wards 31/32 (sampling in response to a separate ward 31/32 outbreak, 12-163 
17/Nov/2015). W3/W4 sink-specific interventions included sink trap replacement for CRE-164 
colonised sinks (16/Apr/2015, 31/Jul/2015, 11/Aug/2015) and horizontal pipework cleaning 165 
with a brush to try and remove biofilm (11/Aug/2015). 166 
 167 
Cardiac service relocation and decline in CRE colonisation incidence  168 
Given the on-going difficulty in preventing KPC-EC acquisitions, and the isolation of KPC-169 
EC from sinks/drain sites, W3/W4 were closed from 25/Sep/2015 and patients re-located to 170 
another ward to allow replacement of the plumbing infrastructure back to the central drainage 171 
stacks. Replaceable sink plughole devices designed to prevent water aerosolisation in the sink 172 
U-bend and limit biofilm formation were installed (HygieneSiphon, Aquafree; 173 
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https://www.aqua-free.com/en/gb/medical-water-hygiene/products/medical-174 
application/produkt/Ressort/product/hygienesiphon/). 175 
 176 
Controlling for screening and compared to the period immediately pre-intervention (when 177 
screening policy was the same), the incidence of first detection of any CRE or CR-E. coli fell 178 
significantly following the plumbing intervention, both in the MHC and elsewhere in the 179 
hospital (Fig.2C, Table 1); but the decline in incidence was significantly greater in the MHC 180 
(pheterogeneity<0.001), where incidence fell by 89% for any CRE and by 98% for CR-E. coli. 181 
Incidence of CR-K. pneumoniae also fell significantly in both settings, but there was no 182 
evidence that the decline differed between the two settings (pheterogeneity=0.31, Table 1). 183 
However, when patients were transferred back to W3/W4 (from 18/Jan/2016), CR-E. coli 184 
continued to be detected in patients (six first detections in 2016, Fig.2A). Patient colonisation 185 
with other CRE was also observed, in similar numbers to 2014 (Fig.1A); environmental 186 
contamination with CRE in sink/wastewater sites recurred rapidly (Fig.1A), and two 187 
environmental sites (both ward utility room sink drains) were CRE-positive even prior to 188 
patient re-admissions to the ward, suggesting residual contamination after the plumbing 189 
replacement, or re-introduction following the plumbing replacement but prior to patient 190 
readmissions. 191 
 192 
Genomic epidemiology of KPC-EC 193 
268 clinical and environmental CR-E. coli isolates were sequenced. These included 82 194 
isolates from the MHC (2015-2016 [16 environmental]), 36 from W45/W46 (2010-2016), 195 
109 from other CMFT wards/units, and 41 from other regional hospitals (Table S3). Nine 196 
isolates were blaKPC-negative on sequencing; five of these contained blaOXA-48, one blaOXA-181, 197 
and one blaNDM-5, with no known carbapenem resistance mechanisms identified in the 198 
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remaining two. The 259 KPC-EC isolates included all 16 environmental CR-E. coli, 158 199 
isolates which were the first CR-E. coli cultured from patients, 38 sequentially cultured CR-200 
E. coli from patients (longitudinal cultures from 12 patients). For 47/259 isolates sequencing 201 
and patient epidemiological identifiers could not be linked. 202 
 203 
Forty sequence types (STs), including known pathogenic lineages (e.g. ST131), occurred 204 
amongst the KPC-EC isolates (Fig.3, Table S3), highlighting regional KPC-EC diversity. In 205 
contrast, 67/80 (84%) MHC isolates were ST216 versus 59/179 (33%) elsewhere. ST216 has 206 
rarely been reported in other settings. 207 
 208 
ST216 KPC-EC  209 
The ST216 KPC-EC group (n=126; 9,118 variable sites; one blaKPC-negative isolate 210 
[H134880341]) was represented by two main genetic sub-groups consisting of 112 isolates 211 
(main outbreak strain, denoted strain-A1 in Fig.3; ≤65 SNVs between isolates in this cluster, 212 
2012-2016), and 12 isolates respectively (secondary outbreak strain, strain-A2 in Fig.3, ≤25 213 
SNVs between isolates in this cluster; >7,800 SNVs divergent from strain-A1 isolates, 2012-214 
2015). Although the SNV-based distances between strains-A1 and -A2 were large, review of 215 
the ClonalFrameML output suggested these differences represented a single “mega”-216 
recombination event affecting ~1Mb of the genome (Fig.S7).  217 
 218 
All but three ST216 isolates carried blaKPC-2 in a Tn4401a transposon(14), typically 219 
associated with high-level blaKPC expression(15), and flanked by a 5-bp target site 220 
duplication, AGTTG, previously only observed with the Tn4401b isoform in an isolate from 221 
Colombia (Fig.3, Table S3). This relatively unique transposon-flanking sequence unit was 222 
also observed in other lineages within CMFT (e.g. ST401, Fig.3). However, plasmid and 223 
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resistance gene profiles varied considerably, even to some extent within the ST216 KPC-EC 224 
outbreak strains (Figs.3, S8). Overall, these results demonstrated clonal expansion of specific 225 
KPC-EC strains, with significant accessory genome mobility. Most notable was the 226 
emergence and persistence of ST216 KPC-EC strain-A1, isolated from patients and the 227 
environment over four years, and causing outbreaks on W45/W46 (2012) and the MHC 228 
(2015).  229 
 230 
Long-read sequencing demonstrated that the ST216 KPC-EC strain-A1 isolate H124200646 231 
(W46, 2012) contained two plasmids, pKPC-CAD2 (307kb; IncHI2/HI2A; blaKPC present) 232 
and pCAD3 (152kb; IncFIB/FII; blaKPC absent). 83% of pKPC-CAD2 was highly similar 233 
(99% sequence identity) to pKPC-272 (282kb, E. cloacae, GenBank accession CP008825.1), 234 
identified in a sink drain at the National Institutes of Health Clinical Centre, Maryland, USA, 235 
2012(16). In contrast, the other long-read sequence, H151860951 (W4, April 2015), also an 236 
ST216 KPC-EC strain-A1 isolate, contained a blaKPC-plasmid pKPC-CAD1 (200kb; 237 
IncFIB/FII), which had 99% sequence identity over 76% of its length to pCAD3, together 238 
with a 48kb contiguous region including blaKPC that was 99% identical to part of pKPC-239 
CAD2 (Fig.4A). These results suggest the evolution of a blaKPC plasmid similar to pKPC-272 240 
in CMFT within an ST216 KPC-EC strain-A from 2012-2015, including recombination 241 
between pKPC-CAD2 and pCAD3 giving rise to pKPC-CAD1.  242 
 243 
Although plasmid typing based on mapping short-read data to plasmid references should be 244 
interpreted cautiously, sequence comparisons with the outbreak plasmids pKPC-CAD1 and 245 
pKPC-CAD2 were consistent with the emergence of pKPC-CAD1 and its domination within 246 
ST216 KPC-EC strain-A post-2014; and exchange of pKPC-CAD1/pKPC-CAD2/pCAD3 247 
with other E. coli STs (Fig.3; Fig.4B).  248 
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 249 
Environmental CRE isolates 250 
Thirty environmental carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae isolates from W3/W4 were 251 
sequenced, 27 isolated prior to the plumbing replacement, and 16 of which were CR-E. coli , 252 
as described above (13 prior to plumbing replacement). 11/16 E. coli were ST216 KPC-EC 253 
(ten strain-A1, one strain-A2), isolated on eight separate days (in March, May, September 254 
2015, February 2016), and consistent with transmission between patients and the 255 
environment (Fig.3), and persistence/reintroduction following plumbing replacement. The 256 
other 14 isolates represented diverse KPC-CRE, including: K. pneumoniae (n=7), Citrobacter 257 
freundii (n=4), Klebsiella oxytoca (n=1), Enterobacter cloacae (n=1) and Kluyvera 258 
intermedia (n=1). The KPC plasmids in these KPC-CRE likely included the outbreak 259 
plasmids pKPC-CAD1 and pKPC-CAD2, pKpQIL, and others, consistent with the inter-260 
species transfer of a diverse set of blaKPC plasmids.  261 
 262 
DISCUSSION  263 
Our detailed analyses of the largest institutional KPC-E. coli outbreak described to date 264 
demonstrate a complex genetic and epidemiological picture including the emergence of 265 
ST216 KPC-EC strain-A1 as a significant clone in CMFT, causing the major 2015 MHC 266 
outbreak, an antecedent outbreak in 2012, and sporadic cases/small clusters in other wards 267 
and regional healthcare settings. Plasmid-associated dissemination of blaKPC to other E. coli 268 
lineages, including recognised “high-risk” clones such as ST131, was evident, and the 269 
problem substantial, with 514 confirmed patient acquisitions of CR-E. coli over a six-year 270 
period.  271 
 272 
13 
 
Environmental sampling on W3/W4 confirmed that sinks/drains were colonised by multiple 273 
CRE, including the ST216 KPC-EC strains-A1/A2 and other CRE containing the outbreak 274 
KPC plasmids (pKPC-CAD1, pKPC-CAD2), potentially representing a persistent reservoir 275 
between patient-associated outbreaks, and plausibly explaining why this large outbreak was 276 
refractory to standard IPC bundles. Supporting this, the incidence of new CR-E. coli 277 
detections declined substantially after ward plumbing replacement and temporary relocation 278 
of patients (Figs.1A, 2A, 2C), consistent with a major contribution from the ward 279 
environment. However, after W3/W4 reopened the environment was rapidly re-contaminated, 280 
including with ST216 KPC-EC strain-A1, and CRE were again detected in patients, 281 
suggesting that this type of intervention has limited durability. National and international 282 
guidelines on CRE management recommend rectal screening, strict contact precautions, 283 
isolation/cohorting of cases, and antimicrobial stewardship to limit transmission(12, 13, 17), 284 
all measures already implemented in CMFT. Current guidelines do not address the control of 285 
large, persistent outbreaks, or advise on the sampling and management of environmental 286 
reservoirs, and there is limited evidence in support of any given measure(18). It is unclear 287 
why a particular strain of KPC-E. coli predominated in the outbreak described, as opposed to 288 
other CRE contemporaneously found in the environment - differences in gastrointestinal 289 
colonisation ability of species, or an unidentified point source could be potential hypotheses.  290 
 291 
The response to this outbreak caused major disruption to the hospital and regional cardiac 292 
services. Given that almost all cases represented colonisations and not infections, the risks of 293 
associated delays in cardiac interventions were debated, although the impact of these were 294 
not formally quantified. The estimated cost of CRE to CMFT in the first 8 months of 2015 295 
was £5.2m(19), and the MHC outbreak contributed significantly to this, with ~£240,000 296 
spent on the W3/W4 plumbing replacement.  297 
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 298 
The study has several limitations, including its observational nature, with only a year of 299 
follow-up after the W3/W4 plumbing replacement. Limited environmental sampling may 300 
have meant that the extent of contamination and diversity of CRE in environmental niches 301 
was underestimated. Environmental sampling was restricted to wards on which CRE 302 
outbreaks were detected and focused predominantly on sink/drain sites (as initial sampling 303 
suggested these were most heavily contaminated); however, component parts of each sink 304 
drainage system were not sampled consistently due to resource issues and so relative CRE 305 
isolation prevalence from any given site type needs to be interpreted with caution. We only 306 
sequenced single isolates cultured from individuals at any given time-point due to resource 307 
limitations, and may therefore have underestimated the CRE strain diversity within patients. 308 
Other non-E. coli Enterobacteriaceae were not comprehensively sequenced, possibly 309 
underestimating dissemination of pKPC-CAD1 and pKPC-CAD2; however, even our limited 310 
sequencing of CREs from the environment in 2015 identified these plasmids (and other KPC 311 
plasmids) in multiple species. Although genetic overlap between environmental and patient 312 
isolates was consistent with transmission between these compartments (Fig.3), the numbers 313 
were too small to infer directionality. Of the two predominant KPC plasmid types present 314 
within the ST216 KPC-EC strain-A1 outbreak clone, one (pKPC_CAD2) was transferred to 315 
multiple E. coli STs (Figs.3, 4B), and another (pKPC_CAD1) may have contributed to the 316 
clone’s success from 2014 (Fig.4B), although the genetic/biological mechanisms 317 
underpinning this have not been explored.  318 
 319 
Our experience highlights the limited evidence for managing large CRE outbreaks including 320 
environmental sampling protocols and interventions, despite numerous centres reporting 321 
similar experiences with wastewater sites acting as CRE reservoirs(18, 20-23). Widespread 322 
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colonisation with KPC-EC is a concern, as E. coli is a common gastrointestinal colonizer and 323 
cause of infection, and any stable association between blaKPC and E. coli, particularly in 324 
pathogenic lineages such as ST131 (Fig.3), represents a significant clinical and transmission 325 
threat. Although our analyses focused on CRE, similar wider environmental contamination 326 
and dissemination of carbapenem-susceptible Enterobacteriaceae seem plausible. A more 327 
robust evidence base delineating transmission networks (including initial contamination of 328 
sink sites), drivers and effective control measures (including differential impacts of 329 
decontamination methods on particular species/strains), is needed to minimize the financial, 330 
clinical and social impacts of CRE outbreaks. 331 
  332 
MATERIALS and METHODS 333 
Setting  334 
CMFT is one of the largest hospital trusts in northwest England. The MHC manages >10,000 335 
patients/year, and in 2015 included two 28-bedded inpatient wards (Wards 3 [W3] and 4 336 
[W4]), an acute facility (Ward 35), intensive care unit, and cardiac catheter laboratory. Both 337 
W3 and W4 comprised three bays, four single-patient side-rooms, and a shared kitchen (Figs. 338 
S1A, S1B). 339 
 340 
IPC measures 341 
CRE screening/IPC measures, based on UK guidelines(11), were implemented Trust-wide 342 
from mid-2014. Enhanced measures were introduced in April 2015 in response to the MHC 343 
KPC-EC outbreak (Table S1). In addition, W3/W4 (where most KPC-EC cases were 344 
observed) were closed to replace plumbing infrastructure back to the drainage stacks (Fig. 345 
S2) from September 2015. Staff screening was not undertaken, consistent with national 346 
guidelines(11).  347 
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 348 
Patient CRE screening 349 
Rectal swabs were screened for CRE using selective chromogenic agar (ChromID CARBA, 350 
Biomerieux; published sensitivity: 89-100%, specificity: 95%(24-26)) to August 2014, and 351 
the Cepheid Xpert Carba-R assay (published sensitivity: 97-100%, specificity: 99%(27, 28)) 352 
from August 2014, alongside an in-house multiplex PCR (blaKPC, blaNDM, blaOXA-48) from 353 
November 2014. The Cepheid assay was used on specimens from patients with admissions to 354 
the Trust in the last 12 months, those admitted from overseas, or those due to be transferred 355 
to a district general hospital (to facilitate transfer planning). All other samples were tested 356 
using the multiplex PCR. Species identification of isolates was performed using MALDI-357 
TOF mass spectrometry (Bruker).  358 
 359 
Epidemiological analyses 360 
CMFT electronic bacteriology records were linked on NHS number to patient administration 361 
data (01/Jan/2010-01/Jan/2017) and anonymised, and the first-CRE-positive test result per 362 
patient (rectal screening or clinical specimen) was considered in the evaluation of CRE 363 
incidence trends. Trends and the impact of IPC interventions were analysed retrospectively. 364 
 365 
As CMFT CRE screening rates changed over time in response to national guidance and local 366 
IPC interventions, and a key aim was to specifically evaluate the impact of ward closure and 367 
a radical plumbing intervention in the MHC on CRE acquisition rates, we considered CRE 368 
detection rates in four periods delineated by three time points: the implementation of national 369 
CPE IPC policy in mid-2014 (which substantially increased the number of screens 370 
performed), the beginning of the MHC-specific intervention (patient relocation and plumbing 371 
infrastructure replacement on W3/W4), and the end of the MHC intervention. 372 
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 373 
First-CRE positive screens were used as a pragmatic proxy for CRE acquisition (i.e. a 374 
“case”), given that 89% of patients first-CRE positive on the MHC had a negative rectal 375 
screen within the preceding 14 days (79% within 7 days; Figs S3-5). Information on specific 376 
carbapenemase mechanism was not consistently available for all isolates, precluding our 377 
ability to perform these analyses specifically by carbapenemase gene family (Table S2). 378 
 379 
We tested the hypothesis that CRE acquisitions (reflected by first CRE-positive screens) 380 
changed on the MHC more than other hospital wards following the W3/W4 closure/plumbing 381 
intervention using negative binomial regression models for the weekly counts of first (per 382 
person) CRE detection ≥2 days post-admission (i.e. cases), using weekly numbers of persons 383 
screened ≥2 days post-admission as an offset (i.e. adjusting for screening rates, and counting 384 
each patient as screened as long as they had one or more screens per week). Models were 385 
fitted (R v3.4.1) for CRE, carbapenem-resistant E. coli (CR-E. coli), and carbapenem-386 
resistant K. pneumoniae (CR-K. pneumoniae). We included period and ward location (MHC 387 
versus other wards) as independent variables, plus interaction terms between period and 388 
location (details in Supplementary Methods). 389 
 390 
Environmental sampling and sample processing  391 
In 2015, environmental samples were taken from ward sites using charcoal swabs, and 392 
cultured on ChromID CARBA (18 hours, 37°C). After January 2016, ~20mls of wastewater 393 
was aspirated from sink P-traps, shower drains or toilets. Aspirates were centrifuged at 394 
4000rpm for 10mins, 15mls of supernatant were discarded, and the pellet was re-suspended 395 
in the remaining 5mls. One ml of sample was then incubated aerobically overnight (~37°C) 396 
in 5mls trypticase soy broth with an ertapenem disc; the multiplex PCR (as above) was 397 
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performed on broths to identify blaKPC-positive samples for subsequent culture on ChromID 398 
CARBA. Environmental sampling prior to January 2016 was not systematic; after January 399 
2016, 75 wastewater sites on W3/W4 were sampled fortnightly on rotation (half of the sites 400 
one week and half the next). These sites included toilets, sink basins and sink drains.  401 
 402 
Genome sequencing and sequence data analysis 403 
To provide genetic context for the outbreak, we sequenced retrievable, archived KPC-EC 404 
patient and environmental isolates from CMFT, and patient isolates collected for regional 405 
public health surveillance (Supplementary Methods; Table S3). We also sequenced a small 406 
subset of non-E. coli environmental CRE that had been stored (n=14) ad hoc as part of 407 
outbreak sampling prior to the plumbing replacement.  408 
 409 
For Illumina sequencing (HiSeq 2500, 150bp PE reads), DNA was extracted using Quickgene 410 
(Fujifilm, Japan), with an additional mechanical lysis step following chemical lysis (FastPrep, 411 
MP Biomedicals, USA). Two outbreak isolates (H124200646, H151860951) were selected 412 
for long-read sequencing based on Illumina data. For long-read sequencing (PacBio [n=1], 413 
MinION [n=1]) DNA was extracted using the Qiagen Genomic tip 100/G kit (Qiagen, 414 
Netherlands) (Supplementary Methods; sequencing data available under NCBI BioProject 415 
PRJNA379782). 416 
 417 
In silico species identification was performed using Kraken(29). Illumina reads were then 418 
mapped to species-specific references (E. coli CFT073 [AE014075.1], and the ST216 419 
reference H151860951) and base-calling performed as previously(30). De novo assembly was 420 
performed using SPAdes (v3.6)(31) and resistance gene, blaKPC plasmid and Tn4401 typing 421 
using BLASTn and mapping-based approaches (Supplementary Methods; Table S3). 422 
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 423 
2D-reads were extracted from MinION sequence data using poretools(32); hybridSPAdes(31) 424 
and Canu(33) were used to generate de novo hybrid assemblies from MinION+Illumina data 425 
(Supplementary Methods). PacBio sequence data were de novo assembled using HGAP3(34). 426 
E. coli phylogenies were reconstructed using IQTree(35) and ClonalFrameML(36), and 427 
visualised in iTOL(37) (Supplementary Methods).  428 
 429 
Ethical approval 430 
As the investigations formed part of a Trust board-approved outbreak response, ethical 431 
approval was not required under NHS governance arrangements (Supplementary Methods).  432 
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FIGURE LEGENDS 606 
Figure 1.A. The number of individuals on the Manchester Heart Centre (MHC) wards with 607 
first-ever positive carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae detection, by week, stratified by 608 
genus group/species of the organism isolated. blaKPC-positive Enterobacteriaceae detected in 609 
environmental samples over the same timeframe are also shown. The MHC outbreak was 610 
declared by the Infection Prevention and Control Team in the first week in 2015 (arrow). B. 611 
Timeline of infection prevention and control measures instituted. C. Bed occupancy per week 612 
in the MHC, demonstrating the impact of infection control interventions on clinical activity. 613 
 614 
Figure 2.A, B. Counts of individuals with first carbapenem-resistant E. coli detection by 615 
ward location. Detections on days 0 and 1 of admission are excluded. Faint vertical lines 616 
correspond to the boundaries of four time periods: P1-prior to implementation of systematic 617 
carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae (CPE) rectal screening policy; P2-618 
implementation of CPE rectal screening policy consistent with national guidance; P3-closure 619 
of W3/W4 and replacement of plumbing infrastructure; P4-reopening of W3/W4 to patient 620 
admissions. C. Panels show incidence rate ratios for rates of first positive carbapenem-621 
resistant E. coli detection, carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae detection, and any 622 
carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae detection ≥2 days post-admission relative to period 623 
P2 in the same location (Manchester Heart Centre [MHC] vs rest of CMFT). An IRR is not 624 
shown for P3 in the MHC due to unit closure during this time period to facilitate plumbing 625 
replacement. 626 
 627 
Figure 3. Recombination-corrected phylogeny of 259 sequenced KPC-E. coli (and nine E. 628 
coli isolates that were blaKPC negative on sequencing) from CMFT and other regional 629 
hospitals in northwest England, annotated with collection date, ward/centre location, Tn4401 630 
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type and outbreak plasmid types. Earliest available sequences per patient are denoted “first 631 
carbapenem-resistant E. coli from patient” if the stored isolate collection date was ≤7 days 632 
from the first isolation date in the TRACE database, or “sequential carbapenem-resistant E. 633 
coli from patient” if the stored isolate date was after this. KPC-EC isolates from a Public 634 
Health England (PHE) project sequencing the first ten KPC-Enterobacteriaceae from 635 
hospitals in northwest England (2009-2014) are denoted “regional study isolates”. 636 
“Environmental isolates” denote KPC-EC cultured during an initial environmental prevalence 637 
survey on W3/W4 (10/Mar/2015); any KPC-EC isolated as part of subsequent, intermittent 638 
IPC-associated environmental sampling (09/Apr/2015-17/Nov/15); and isolates available at 639 
the time of analysis from environmental and patient samples from a separate, on-going study 640 
(commenced January 2016). 641 
 642 
Figure 4.A. Alignments of Manchester Heart Centre (MHC) outbreak 2012 KPC plasmid 643 
pKPC-CAD2 (W45/46; Tn4401a+blaKPC) and the 2015 MHC KPC plasmid pKPC-CAD1 644 
(Tn4401a+blaKPC), highlighting the recombination of the Tn4401a+blaKPC-harbouring 48kb 645 
segment from pKPC-CAD2 with pCAD3 to generate pKPC-CAD1. Regions of sequence 646 
homology are represented by salmon-pink links drawn between alignments. pKPC-272 647 
(GenBank accession CP008825.1), a plasmid identified in an isolate in a sink drain at the 648 
National Institutes of Health Clinical Centre, Maryland, USA, 2012, demonstrates significant 649 
sequence homology with pKPC-CAD2. B. Incidence plot of different E. coli STs and likely 650 
MHC-related KPC plasmid types across hospital locations. 651 
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Table 1. Incidence rate ratios (IRR) for detection from screening swabs 2 or more days after admission, a proxy marker of acquisition, 652 
in Central Manchester Foundation NHS Trust of: (i) all carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae; (ii) carbapenem-resistant E. coli; and 653 
(iii) carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae, modelling the impact of the W3/W4 closures and plumbing replacement on acquisition. Four 654 
time periods were evaluated: P1-prior to implementation of systematic carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae (CPE) rectal screening 655 
policy; P2-implementation of CPE rectal screening policy consistent with national guidance; P3-closure of W3/W4 and replacement of plumbing 656 
infrastructure; P4-reopening of W3/W4 to patient admissions. 657 
 All carbapenem-resistant 
Enterobacteriaceae 
(number of cases=3,086) 
Carbapenem-resistant E. 
coli 
(number of cases=502) 
Carbapenem-resistant K. 
pneumoniae 
(number of cases=1,134) 
 IRR 95% CI P IRR 95% CI P IRR 95% CI p 
Manchester Heart Centre (MHC)          
Week 03 2010 to week 26 2014 (P1) 0.61 0.31-1.20 0.15 0.15 0.04-0.67 0.012 0.19 0.04-0.82 0.026 
Week 27 2014 to week 39 2015 (P2; 
reference period*) 
1.00   1.00   1.00   
Week 40 2015 to week 02 2016 (P3; 
W3/W4 closed) 
- - - - - - - - - 
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Week 03 2016 to week 52 2016 (P4) 0.11 0.05-0.22 <0.001 0.02 0.00-0.14 <0.001 0.27 0.09-0.78 0.015 
Other hospital locations           
Week 03 2010 to week 26 2014 (P1) 2.85 1.87-4.34 <0.001 2.51 1.57-4.03 <0.001 0.75 0.30-1.86 0.53 
Week 27 2014 to week 39 2015 (P2; 
reference period) 
1.00   1.00   1.00   
Week 40 2015 to week 02 2016 (P3) 0.41 0.26-0.63 <0.001 1.12 0.61-2.05 0.71 0.27 0.17-0.42 <0.001 
Week 03 2016 to week 52 2016 (P4) 0.49 0.32-0.76 0.002 0.47 0.31-0.71 <0.001 0.47 0.28-0.77 0.003 
 MHC vs other location in reference 
period (P2) 
1.69 0.81-3.50 0.16 9.05 3.98-20.55 <0.001 0.45 0.24-0.86 0.015 
Heterogeneity between reduction in 
MHC vs other location 
         
Week 03 2010 to week 26 2014 (P1)   <0.001   0.001   0.098 
Week 40 2015 to week 02 2016 (P3)   -   -   - 
Week 03 2016 to week 52 2016 (P4)   <0.001   0.003   0.31 
* P2 chosen as reference period because of change in screening policy between P1 and P2 (Table S2, Fig.S6), meaning that a greater incidence 658 
would be expected in P2 due to more patients being screened every week. 659 




